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Abstract
Besides an official website mall (OWM), retail stores on the third party e-commerce platform(3PEP) is an another important
online channel that manufacturers adopt to sell online. How to properly price products in these two channels simultaneously is a
tough problem to firms and gains much attention by researchers. In this paper, we analyze their channel choice, and give demand
functions of the two channels based on the consumers’ segmentation and preference. Then we design a sale model including two
online channels: OWM and a retail store on 3PEP. According the Stackelberg game theory, we calculate and discuss the optimal
pricing strategies of the manufacturer and retailer in three feasible regions. The result shows that manufacturers emphasizing
channel sales prefer to choose pricing strategies that helps two online channels share the online market. But some manufacturers
think adjusting the OWM’s price and the wholesale price to control the retailer’s pricing strategies is reasonable and necessary,
even if nobody will prefer the OWM.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
Peer-review under responsibility of KES International.
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1. Introduction
An official website provides a good chance for manufacturers to satisfy their consumers. With the development of
the internet, many companies start to exhibit products by colorful pictures and detailed descriptions on their official
website, some of them even try to sell products through this new channel. Actually, the official website Mall(OWM)
is not the only way selling online. Before the birth of OWM, some retailers have brought kinds of products to the
third party e-commerce platform (3PEP), such as e-Bay, Taobao, etc.
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3PEP is often the first stop that people learn to shop online, on which they know how to search for aimed goods,
make a purchase, and evaluate a purchased good. With the accumulation of shopping experience online, people
become more and more experienced and sensitive about price. So when discovering an OWM, they prefer to
compare it with the 3PEP, and choose a cheapest sale channel to purchase. To avoid being eliminated by consumers
and the channel price conflict, OWM’s managers and 3PEP’s retailers usually have to make price strategies
reasonably.
In this paper, we consider two online-selling channels with a direct channel named by OWM and a retail channel
located on 3PEP. Then we study three kinds of price strategies that OWM’s managers and 3PEP’s retailers might
adopt, and analyze how consumers with different experience make their final decision under the three strategies.
Finally, we aim to characterize what types of pricing strategies are optimal for OWM’s managers and 3PEP’s
retailers in their market competition.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the related pricing literature.
Section 3 shows the basic model and donations of dual online channels. Section 4 describes the competitions and
pricing strategies between these two online channels. Finally, Section 5 draws the conclusion and discussion.
2. Literature review
Multi-channel operation tends to make companies to face dilemmas, for it not only helps them to expand the
market share and brand influence, but also bring channel conflicts and confused management. Economists have
given lots of study on multi-channels pricing and production strategies. Channel optimization in multiple-channel
systems is a basic problem in marketing (Corstjens and Doyle 1979, Jørgensen and Kort 2002)1,2 Xu (2009)3
explores the optimal pricing and product quality decisions in a distribution channel. Rodríguez and Aydın (2015)4
characterizes the pricing decisions in a dual-channel structure. With the development of the electronic commerce,
some researchers gradually pay attention to the online channel. Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000)5 compare pricing
behavior at 41 Internet and conventional retail outlets, and conclude that there is lower friction in many dimensions
of Internet competition. Chiang et al. (2003)6 point out that the online direct channel can increase the manufacturer’s
negotiated share of cooperative profits. Overby and Forman (2015)7 study how the diffusion of an e-channel affected
the geographic trading patterns and price dispersion of the wholesale. When a manufacturer try to expand her market
through two online channels, she meets the same questions in these traditonal researches. One of key questions is to
price simutaneously in two online channels.
Up to now, there are two wide-applied methods for pricing: one is cost-based pricing, the other is value-based
pricing, and the latter is usually much better for companies (Nagle et al. 2008)8. Consumers’ behavior is another
critical factor that managers consider in pricing decision. Strategic consumers wish to maximize individual utility. At
each time point, they may purchase the product at current price, remain at a cost to purchase later, or exit9.
Understanding the difference and similarity among consumers in diverse regions is significant for businesses to
sustain in the competitive market (Lim and Cham 2015)10. Effective retail management strategies are often linked to
the creation of consumer experience (Rose et al. 2012)11. We can get that manufacturers’ pricing strategies are
closely dependent on consumers’ behaviors. In this paper, we try to find the optimal pricing strategies for
manufacturers setting two online channels based on consumers’ behavior.
Economists have realized the difference and relationship between online and traditional channels, and mainly
discuss some hybrid channel design problems when a company introduces the online direct channel, such as
consumers’ behaviors, managers’ strategies, and channels’ competition (Moon et al. 2010, Vinhas and Heide
2015)12,13. But most of them usually overlook the conflicts of online channels. Actually, before a company set a
direct channel on the internet, a lot of retailers have sold their products on the 3PEP. Besides the OWM, these retail
stores are also important sale channels for companies. This paper extends the literature related to the manufacturers’
dual-online-channel problems by addressing following questions. How do consumers with different online shopping
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experience make their purchase decisions? How do these two online channels affect each other through pricing
strategies? We try to find the optimal pricing strategies for OWM’s managers and 3PEP’s retailers.
3. Dual-online demand model based on consumers' segmentation and preference
The product is sold at price Pd in the OWM and at price Pr on the 3PEP, as shown in Fig.1. So when a consumer
buys the product in OWM, his economic utility can be denoted as Ud=V-Pd -f versus Ur=V-Pr -f on the 3PEP, where
V and f are the valuation (alternatively called “willingness to pay”) and the express delivery fee of the product
respectively. We assume that the express fee is identical in these two channels.
Express Fee: f
Online Indirect
OWM Price: Pd
Unaffected Consumers (1-θ)
Online Direct
Affected Consumers (θ)
Store on 3PEP
Manufacturer
OWM
Express Fee: f
OWM Price: Pd
Fig. 1. Dual-online-channel structure.
In fact, almost every online consumer is familiar to the famous 3PEP, such as Taobao. But not all of them realize
the existence of the OWM. Traditional researches (e.g., Chiang et al. 2003, Yoo and Lee 2011 )6,14 often pay
attention to the difference between the offline retail channel and the online direct channel, but overlook that
channels’ promotion and influence can affect consumers’ decision process. They suppose all of consumers know all
the channels in their models. But in this paper, we divide online consumers into affected consumers and unaffected
consumers. The former means those consumers who know both of online channels and whose purchase decisions
are affected by OWM. The latter means those consumers who are never affected by OWM. So they just know the
3PEP. Denote the ratio of affected consumers by θ (0≤θ≤1).
Table 1. Month sales of handbags in the Mbaobao official website and a retail store.
Product ID
The official website A retail store on the Taobao
Price Month Sales Price Month Sales
No.1508006401 159 705 159 11
No.14080056 139 2238 139 46
No.15120173 169 326 169 81
No.1510009702 159 339 159 0
No.1408005702 69 3292 68 28
No.1512017001 189 286 149 7
No.1411006704 159 841 149 90
No.1408005302 158 5701 131 50
No.1309002901 358 17661 298 1
No.1507025302 169 2141 138 27
No.15070256 269 2588 239 14
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We assume the online demand D of the product is constant in a period. Unaffected consumers choose the retail
store to purchase by judging Ur ≥0. Affected consumers choose either the retail store or the OWM by comparing Ud
and Ur.
Previous dual channels researchers (e.g., Kacen et al. 2013, Wang and Wang 2014)15,16 think that consumers
prefer offline retail stores more than online direct channels because the former is more familiar and convenient. But
in dual-online channel structure, affected consumers are familiar to both of online channels. Meanwhile, there is no
much difference in payment and delivery between these two channels. In practice, when the OWM’s pricing is
acceptable, affected consumers prefer the direct channel rather than an online retail store. A list of recent sale
datashown in Table 1 can illustrate the opinion by handbag sales in the Mbaobao official website and a retail store
on the Taobao. It is shown that the official website has higher sales than the retail store even when the former’s price
is higher than the latter’s.
As to Wang and Wang (2014)16, we assume the preference of consumers to the OWM as  . It represents the
proportion of affected consumers who prefer to afford the product in the OWM. For Pd - Pr < a, all of the affected
consumers prefer to the OWM. For Pd - Pr > b, nobody will be glad to choose the OWM. For a ≤ Pd -Pr ≤ b, affected
consumers make a choice between these two channels. a and b represent the consumers’ minimum and maximum
acceptance of price differential (0≤ a ≤ b) respectively. The function of consumers’ preference can be written as


 
!
∀#
∃#%
#
##
∃#
&
.                                    , 0
,                ,)(
,                                    ,  1
bPP
bPPa
ab
PPb
aPP
rd
rd
rd
rd

(1)
Based on consumers’ segmentation and preference, we have
 ∋∋& DQ d , (2)
)1(  ∋#∋& DQr , (3)
where Qd is the demand for the OWM, and Qr is the demand for the retail store on the 3PEP. Fig.2 illustrates the
demand functions. When Pr > V - f, nobody will purchase the product in the retail store because their utility Ur is
negative. The same goes for Pd and the OWM’s sale. So we only consider the case of max (Pd , Pr) ≤ V - f.
(a)
min(V-f, Pr+a)
(b)
min(V-f, Pr+b)
Pd
Qd
Pd -b
D·θ
Pd -a
D·(1-θ) D
Qr
Pr
V -f E
F
M
N
Fig. 2 (a) Demand of the OWM; (b) Demand of the retail store.
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4. Pricing strategies of dual online channels based on demand competition
In this section, we analyze two online channels’ pricing strategies based on the Stackelberg game theory, and
then observe the optimal price and firms’ profit by the parameters sensitivity analysis.
In the first stage, the manufacturer, as a Stackelberg leader, sets the wholesale price W and the OWM’s price Pd.
In the second stage, the retailer determines the retail price Pr to maximize his profit. W ≤ Pd, since the wholesale
priceW should not exceed Pd in case the retailer buys the product in the OWM.
According to Eq.(2) and Eq.(3), we have
rrr QWP ∋#& )( , (4)
rddm QCWQCP ∋##∋#& )()( , (5)
where πr and πm are the profit of the retailer and the manufacturer respectively. C is the marginal cost incurred by
the manufacturer for the product. The manufacturer sells the product to retailer at W, and to consumers at Pd.
Considering the sub-game perfection, we adopt the reverse analysis method to discuss these two channels’ pricing
decisions.
4.1. Retailer’s pricing strategies
The retailer controls the variable Pr to maximize his profit. According to Eq.(3) and Fig.2(b)we obtain the
optimal price as follow by maximizing the retailer’s profit.
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where R1-R4 (shown as Fig.3.) are feasible regions for the OWM’s price and wholesale price when the retail price on
different branches in Fig.2(b).
(a) (b) (c)
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Price:W
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Region R1-R2-: Retail price located on EF in Fig. 2(b) (a): Figure of R1- R4 for fVabb #%#) /)(
Region R3: Retail price located on FM in Fig. 2(b) (b): Figure of R1- R4 for fVabb #+#) /)( and fVabba #%#)# /)(3 
Region R4: Retail price located on MN in Fig2(b) (c): R1- R4 for fVabba #+#)# /)(3
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Fig. 3. Feasible regions for the OWM’s price and wholesale price.
The manufacturer can acquire the valuation of the product V, the ratio of affected consumers θ and the minimum
and maximum price differential acceptance: a and b through investigations or other methods. Then she can set Pd
less than V-f-a, and control the wholesale price less than Pd. Namely, she sets her pricing strategies in R1. Likewise,
she can also set her pricing strategies in R2-R4.
Different strategies regions make the retailer change his pricing decision. When the manufacturer set her pricing
decision in R1 and R2, the retailer wants to maximize his profit by adjusting Pr, so his optimal pricing decision is Pr*
= V - f, which is independent on W and Pd. In this case, all affected consumers prefer to buy the product in the OWM.
And the unaffected consumers would buy the product when the retail price Pr ≤ V - f.
When the manufacturer chooses her price strategies in R4, nobody will be glad to buy the product in the OWM
because the price Pd is too much higher than Pr. So the retailer can set the price at Pd - b to attract all of online
consumers and maximize her profit. At that time, the optimal price Pr* is related to Pd, and independent on the
wholesale price.
Finally, when the manufacturer makes price decisions in R3, the optimal price of the retail depends on the
wholesale price and the OWM’s price. Thus, we need to analyze the manufacturer’s strategies further.
4.2. Manufacturer’s pricing strategies
Anticipating the retailer’s choices, the manufacturer will maximize her total profits by choosing the wholesale
price W and the OWM’s price Pd subject to W ≤ Pd. Meanwhile, W cannot be higher than Pr because the retailer will
not buy the product with a negative profit. There are three feasible figures of R1, R2 R3 and R4, which are shown as
Fig.3(a), (b) and (c).
In R1 and R2 of Fig.3(a), the retailer sets his price as V-f (see Eq.(6)). The OWM’s price, relative to Pr, is so low
that all the affected consumers prefer to buy the product in the OWM.
Theorem 1. The manufacturer’s optimal prices in R1 are located at point “m” in Fig.3(a), where the optimal
wholesale price and the OWM’s price are equal. That is, Pd*=W*= V- f- a. In R2, the manufacturer’s optimal prices
are located at point “n” in Fig.3(a), where the wholesale price and the OWM’s price are equal. That is, Pd*=W*= V- f.
Moreover, the price strategies at point “n” are better than them at point “m”.
The proof of Theorem 1 is given in Appendix A. The manufacturer knows the retailer’s optimal price when she
makes the price decision in R1. So she wishes to find the optimal price combination of W and Pd in R1 to maximize
her profit. In fact, “m” is the optimal price combination point in R1 which has been proved in Appendix A. Similarly,
“n” is the optimal price combination point in R2. So when the manufacturer wants to attract all of the affected
consumers to buy the product in the OWM, she will compare the profit of these two point: “m” and “n”, and then
choose her optimal decision: Pd* and W*. It is proved that price strategies at point “n” could gain more profit for the
manufacturer.
In region R3 of Fig.3(a), the manufacturer adjusts her OWM’s price Pd and wholesale price W, where the
retailer’s optimal price Pr*=[Pd+W+(b-a)/θ-b]/2 (see Eq.(6)). In fact, the adjustment causes the OWM to lose some
affected consumers who prefer the retail store due to his lower price. So in R3, the manufacturer wants to find the
combined optimal wholesale pricing W* and OWM’s pricing Pd* to maximize her profit. Substituting Pr* into
manufacturers’ profit Eq.(5), we find the optimal pricing strategies.
Theorem 2. In region R3, The manufacturer’s optimal prices are located at point “k” in Fig.3(a), where the
optimal wholesale price is W*= V- f- 2a+b-(b-a)/θ, and the optimal OWM’s price is Pd* =V-f.
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The proof of theorem 2 is given in Appendix B.
In R4, Pd, relative to Pr , is raised so high that no one would like to purchase the product in the OWM. The retailer
sets the optimal price at Pr* = Pd - b. For Pd ≤ V -f, Pr is also lower than V -f. All of the online consumers will buy
the product in the retail store.
Theorem 3. When the manufacturer makes her price decision in R4, her optimal decisions are located at the point
“j”, where the OWM’s price is V-f, and the wholesale price is V-f-b-(b-a)/θ. So the optimal retail price is Pr* =V-f-b.
The proof of Theorem 3 is given in Appendix C. When the manufacturer makes her price decision in R4, she
prefers to sell the product only in the retail channel. Under this condition, all of online consumers buy the product in
the retail store when Pr ≤ V -f. The profit structure of the manufacturer becomes very simple. Although the OWM’s
demand is zero, Pd still influences the optimal pricing decision.
Table 2. Optimal pricing decision of the manufacturer and the retailer in R1-R4.
Regions The optimal decision point
in Fig.1(a)
The optimal OWM’s
price: Pd*
The optimal wholesale
price:W*
The optimal retail
price: Pr*
R1 “m” V-f-a V-f-a V-f
R2 “n” V-f V-f V-f
R3 “k” V-f V- f- 2a+b-(b-a)/θ V-f-a
R4 “j” V-f V-f-b-(b-a)/θ V-f-b
The optimal pricing decisions in different feasible regions in Fig.3(a) are listed in table 2. The related results in
Fig.3(b) and Fig.3(c) can be analyzed using the same method. In fact, some manufacturers are not willing to use the
OWM without any sale. So the pricing strategies in Theorem 3 are usually abandoned by these managers because no
consumer comes in. But other manufacturers think the pricing decision in R4 is reasonable, because they control the
optimal pricing right. Retailers have to set their optimal price based on the OWM’s price.
5. Concluding remarks
Selling a product by two online channels, the manufacturer has to make a sufficient analysis of channels’
difference and consumers’ behaviors. In this paper, we find that consumers affected by the OWM often compare it
with the retail store before making a decision. When buying a well-known brand of products, some consumers will
have a strong preference for the OWM, although sometimes, the price in the OWM is higher than that in the retail
store. Different pricing decisions lead consumers to make variable shopping choices. In this paper, we discuss
consumers how to make a final decision in three feasible pricing regions, and give the optimal pricing strategies for
a manufacturer and a retailer in these regions based on the Stackelberg game theory. When the manufacturer make
her pricing decisions in R1 and R2, all of affected consumers prefer the OWM channel. At the moment, the retailer
sets his price as V-f, and the manufacturer has her optimal pricing decisions at point “n” in Fig.3(a). When the
manufacturer adjust her pricing decisions in R3, some affected consumers will prefer the retail store due to his lower
price. In this case, the manufacturer has her optimal pricing decisions at point “k” in Fig.3(a). When the
manufacturer continues to change her decision in R4, no one will be glad to buy the product in the OWM. Under this
sale strategy, the optimal pricing decision of the manufacturer is at point “j” in Fig.3(a).
Future work upon this topic should include the comparison of different pricing decisions. We might illustrate the
algorithm further using a lot of examples and compare the profit of the manufacturer and retailer. Moreover, the
operation data online about prices and sales can be used to examine the pricing methods above.
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Appendix A. Proof of the optimal wholesale price and OWM’s price in region R1 and R2
In R1 and R2, demands of the OWM and the retail store are D·θ and D·(1-θ) respectively. The manufacturer’s
profit is
.)1(
)1()()(
DCWDPD
DCWDCP
d
dm
#∋#)∋&
#∋∋#)∋∋#&

 (7)
The profit function is a linear function of Pd and W. Based on the linear programming theory, the optimal pricing
strategy in R1 is at point “m” in Fig.4., where Pd*= W*=V -f -a.
V-f-a
R1
Wholesale
Price:W
OWM’s
price: Pd


#
)
#
#&
11 d
CPW m
W=Pd
Fig. 4. The Optimal wholesale price and OWM’s price in Region R1
In the same way, we can get “n” is the optimal point in R2. The values of Pd and W at “n” are higher than them at
“m”. Meanwhile, the manufacturer has the same profit function when her pricing decisions are in R1 and R2. It is
easy to prove that price strategies at point “n” could gain more profit for the manufacturer.
Appendix B. Proof of the optimal wholesale price and OWM’s price in region R3
In R3, Pr*=[Pd+W+(b-a)/θ-b]/2. Substituting Pr* into the manufacturers’ profit function Eq.(5), we can get the
profit function of the manufacturer as follow.
])(1[)()()(
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ab
PPbDCP rdrddm #
##∋#∋∋#)
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.
(8)
Since Pr*≤ V-f, we have
/)(-)(2 abbfVPW d ###)#% . (9)
All of points in R3 match the condition above. Then we assume W=Pd-r, where r is an arbitrary constant.
Substitute the relation into Eq. (8), we can get
1385 Jieyu Lei et al. /  Procedia Computer Science  60 ( 2015 )  1377 – 1385 
ab
rbabbDrDCWm #
###)∋∋∋)∋#& 2/]/)[()(  
. (10)
The manufacturer’s profit increases with the wholesale price W. So in R2, when r changes, all of the optimal
pricing points are located on line segment “jk” in Fig.3 (a), that means Pd*=V-f. Substituting Pd* into Eq. (8), we can
get
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m , so W*=V-f+(b-a)/(2θ)-b/2. It can be proved that W*=V-f+(b-a)/(2θ)-b/2 is beyond the line
segment “jk” based b≥a. On the line segment “jk”, “k” is the closest point near to the optimal point. So the real
optimal price in R3 should be “k”.
Appendix C. Proof of the optimal wholesale price and OWM’s price in region R4
In R4, the manufacturer’s profit is πm =(W-C)·D, which increases with the wholesale price. In region R4, the
retailer set his price as Pd-b. Since Pr≥W, so the optimal wholesale price is W≤Pd-b. It is easy to prove that all of
points in R4 meet the condition above. So the optimal wholesale price is W*=V-f-b-(b-a)/θ when Pd*=V-f, the optimal
pricing decisions are located at point “j”.
References
1. Corstjens M., Doyle P. Channel optimization in complex marketing systems. Management Science 1979; 25(10): 1014-1025.
2. Jørgensen S., Kort P. M. Optimal pricing and inventory policies: Centralized and decentralized decision making. European Journal of
Operational Research 2002; 138(3): 578-600.
3. Xu X. Optimal price and product quality decisions in a distribution channel. Management Science 2009; 55(8): 1347-1352.
4. Rodríguez B., Aydın G. Pricing and assortment decisions for a manufacturer selling through dual channels. European Journal of Operational
Research 2015; 242(3): 901-909.
5. Brynjolfsson E., Smith M. D. Frictionless commerce? A comparison of Internet and conventional retailers. Management Science 2000; 46(4):
563-585.
6. Chiang W. K., Chhajed D., Hess J. D. Direct marketing, indirect profits: A strategic analysis of dual-channel supply-chain design.
Management Science 2003; 49(1): 1-20.
7. Overby E., Forman C. The effect of electronic commerce on geographic purchasing patterns and price dispersion. Management Science 2014;
61(2), 431-453.
8. Nagle T. T., Hogen J. H. The strategy and tactics of pricing: a guide to growing more profitably. Beijing: Huaxai Publishing House; 2008. P.
1-70.
9. Su X. Intertemporal pricing with strategic customer behavior. Management Science 2007; 53(5): 726-741.
10. Lim Y. M., Cham T. H. A profile of the Internet shoppers: Evidence from nine countries. Telematics and Informatics 2015; 32(2): 344-354.
11. Rose S., Clark M., Samouel P., et al. Online customer experience in e-retailing: an empirical model of antecedents and outcomes. Journal of
Retailing 2012; 88(2): 308-322.
12. Moon Y., Yao T., Friesz T. L. Dynamic pricing and inventory policies: A strategic analysis of dual channel supply chain design. Service
Science 2010; 2(3): 196-215.
13. Sa V. A., B H. J. Forms of competition and outcomes in dual distribution channels: the distributor’s perspective. Marketing Science 2014;
34(1), 160-175.
14. Yoo W S, Lee E. Internet channel entry: a strategic analysis of mixed channel structures. Marketing Science, 2011; 30(1): 29-41.
15. Kacen J., Hess J., Chiang W. K. Bricks or clicks? Consumer attitudes toward traditional stores and online stores. Global Economics and
Management Review 2013; 18(1):12-21.
16. Wang W., Wang H. Pricing decision in dual channel supply chain with channel preference. Journal of WUT (Information & Management
engineering) 2014; 36(4): 533-536.
